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ABSTRACT:  Within the 65+ age group, the percentage of labour market income received by the 
top 1% of earners has increased from about 30% in 1982 to more than 60% in 2002. The trend is 
smooth, is roughly uniform across provinces and does not appear to have been accelerated by top 
marginal tax rate reductions in 1988. Hence there is little evidence from this time series that 
further marginal tax rate reductions would have an important permanent effect on aggregate 
labour supply for this age group. Moreover, it is unlikely that this period could provide evidence 
regarding aggregate labour supply effects for this group with respect to reductions in Old Age 
Security or Guaranteed Income Supplement clawbacks, because the top 1% of earners are above 
the income range served by these programs.  
 
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS:  H24, H55, J26 
 
KEYWORDS: Income distribution of seniors, employment income of seniors 
 
RESUME: Dans le groupe des 65 ans et plus, la part des revenus du travail perçu par les 1% des 
mieux nantis est passé de 30% en 1982 à plus de 60% en 2002. Cette tendance est régulière, 
relativement uniforme à travers toutes les provinces et ne semble pas avoir été provoquée par la 
baisse du taux d'imposition marginal le plus élevé en 1988. Par conséquent, notre série temporelle 
apporte peu d’évidence supportant qu’une diminution du taux d'imposition marginal puisse avoir 
des effets permanents considérables sur l’offre globale de travail de cette catégorie d'âge. Par 
ailleurs, il est de même peu probable que cette période puisse mettre en évidence les effets  de la 
réduction du programme de la Sécurité de la vieillesse ou de la récupération fiscale du 
Supplément de revenu garanti sur l’offre globale de travail de ces derniers, puisque les revenus 
perçus par les 1% des mieux nantis sont supérieurs au palier de revenu d’admissibilité à ces 
programmes. 
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 1. Introduction 
Both senior poverty and senior labour market participation have fallen 
dramatically in Canada over the last forty years. The former change and possibly the 
latter change are in large measure due to the introduction of the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS) and the Spousal Allowance (SpA), as supplements to Old Age 
Security (OAS), and the maturation of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). However there is 
still substantial discussion of policies that could possibly increase nontransfer income 
among those over age 65. First, it is viewed that the current system would be more 
sustainable if some portion of transfers could be replaced by nontransfer income. Second, 
there is a concern expressed by some regarding the fall in average measured consumption 
at the time of retirement which may indicate that replacement rates from private and 
public income sources are suboptimally low as compared to the smooth lifetime 
consumption suggested by the standard life cycle model in economics. More broadly, it 
may be that disincentives in the tax/transfer system could be inefficiently reducing the 
contribution seniors could be making to economic output as a whole. 
 There are two types of nontransfer income that could be increased. One is capital 
income: private pension income or return from savings. Kesselman and Poschmann 
(2001) provide an effective discussion of this issue including proposing a new tax 
measure for Canada that would allow after-tax dollars to be contributed to an account that 
would allow both compounding and withdrawals to be tax-free. The second is labour 
income
1: individuals could retire later
2 or work part-time during retirement.
3 
                                                 
1 As compared to policies that increase saving for retirement, policies that increase senior labour income 
might have a faster impact on transfer system participation (as it would not depend upon the accumulation 
of savings) and are probably less vulnerable to difficulties associated with the timing of withdrawals that 
some types of saving-promoting policies might have. (For example, Fretz and Veall, 2000, note that a Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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The main point of this note is that when considering policies that would affect the 
labour income, it should be recognized that employment income for those 65 and over 
has become very polarized. By 2002, more than 60% of all employment income earned 
by seniors was earned by those in the top 1% of the distribution. This group has incomes 
that are largely above the clawback ranges for GIS or OAS and hence face little marginal 
disincentive from these clawbacks. Hence a discussion that focuses on the disincentive 
effects on current aggregate senior employment earnings should likely focus on the same 
tax disincentives that might affect nonseniors as well. Moreover the increase in this 
polarization is smooth through the 1980s and 1990s and is broadly similar across 
provinces. This suggests that there is unlikely to be convincing time series evidence that 
significant tax changes (such as the change in the personal income tax system in 1988) 
have had a major effect on the evolution of top share employment income over the last 
twenty years. 
 Section 2 sets out the issues in the context of previous literature. Section 3 
presents the empirical findings in tabular and graphical form. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
senior with a large RRSP may elect to withdraw it all in one year, sacrificing GIS for that year alone but 
maintaining GIS entitlement in other years. A related strategy would collapse the RRSP the year before 
GIS eligibility.) However saving-promoting policies have the advantage that they may increase the capital 
stock and hence productivity.  
2 Delaying retirement could be one of the easier ways for lifetime labour supply to adjust because many 
jobs have rather rigid hours requirements per week but would permit individuals to work later in life if they 
so wished.  (Denton and Spencer , 2000, discuss increasing the standard retirement age in light of 
increasing life expectancy.) In some cases, the semi-retired choose employment which is particularly 
flexible and hence potentially most responsive to incentives. Baker (2002) studies the retirement incentives 
of the spousal allowance program while Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2003) study retirement incentive 
effects more broadly. Boothby et al. (2003) review barriers to continued labour market participation by 
older workers. Kuhn (2003) emphasizes the potential role of job-to-job mobility. 
3 In this context there is often reference to more flexible retirement arrangements (see e.g. Gunderson , 
1998, Marshall, 2000).  Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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2. Issues and Literature 
  There seems little doubt that the reduction in labour market earnings by seniors is 
at least partly attributable to the expansion of transfer programs as well as the CPP. In 
1965, just 15% of all taxfilers between ages 65-69 were classed as having “pension” as 
their chief source of income. (The rest largely had their principal source of income from 
labour, through farming, fishing, sales, professional income, self employment, etc.) By 
1967 when the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) and the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement were introduced, this had climbed to 23% and rose 
steadily until it hit 50% by 1973. 
However, it is not clear that the fall in labour earnings was due to the substitution 
or disincentive effect of clawbacks in the GIS system.  It could be that this is the income 
effect of additional payments to seniors, magnified by the difficulty in borrowing against 
those payments earlier in life. It may be possible to reduce any disincentive effect by 
changing the clawback rate structure. But the only way to reduce an income or transfer 
effect is to reduce the amount of transfers (e.g. by delaying their onset), increasing 
poverty among those seniors who cannot work.
4  The problem is that the 1967 experience 
does not allow us to disentangle the magnitudes of these two effects. 
However in the federal tax reform in 1988, there was a change in tax rates 
(without a big change in transfers) that might shed light on the possibility of stimulating 
senior labour supply through tax reductions. Sillamaa and Veall (2001) analyze the 
                                                 
4 There could also have been other sorts of effects, for example on social norms regarding the expectation 
of retirement. Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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response to this change for both nonsenior and senior populations.
5 Their results, in  
Table 1
6, would indicate that while senior taxable income as a whole was not very 
sensitive to changes in tax rates, the taxable income received by high-income seniors was 
very sensitive. 
 Table  1 
Tax-Price Elasticity Estimates from Sillamaa and Veall (2001), by Income Class 
  24 < 1986 age < 62  1986 age > 64 
No income restriction  0.26  0.29 
1986 Income > $15K  0.38  0.30 
1986 Income > $25K  0.41  0.57 
1986 Income > $60K  1.00  1.10 
1986 Income > $75K  1.32  1.93 
1986 Income > $100K  1.67  3.12 
The t-statistics of these values all exceed 5 and are typically much greater. Samples 
excluded individuals who changed provinces, residents of Quebec and those who did not 
pay at least $625 tax in 1986 and $700 in 1989. Detailed results and discussion are 
available in the original article. 
 
The results matched previous findings that high-income taxpayers are more 
responsive to tax rate changes than low-income taxpayers (see e.g. Lindsey, 1987; 
Feldstein, 1995; Navratil, 1995; Slemrod, 1996; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Goolsbee, 
                                                 
5 Veall (2000) studies the effects of this change on retirement saving through RRSPs. 
6Sillamaa and Veall posited the underlying model  
 
Yit = µi + γt + β log (1-MTR)  + X'iαt  +  εit                     (1) 
 
where Yit is the earnings of individual i  at time t, µi  is the fixed effect for individual i and γt is a pure time 
effect.  MTR is the marginal tax rate faced by that individual at that time period. β is called a “tax-price 
elasticity” and is a measure of sensitivity of earnings to the tax rate.  X'i  is a row vector of observations on 
individual i on variables that do not vary over time but may have a time-varying effect on Yit (an effect 
summarized by αt) and εit  is a random error. (1) was then first-differenced to yield: 
 
 ∆Yit = ∆γt + β ∆log (1-MTRt) + X'i∆αt  + ∆εit                  (2)      
 
where ∆ denotes the 1989 value of a variable less the 1986 value of that same variable.   
 Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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2000; Gruber and Saez, 2002). They also fit the conventional wisdom that seniors might 
be more responsive because many workers have little opportunity to change their labour 
supply because of the nature of their jobs but seniors have the additional margin of the 
retirement decision. However, Sillamaa and Veall note two important caveats about these 
results. First, because the year 1990 included the run-up to the Goods and Service Tax 
implementation on January 1, 1991 and the beginning of a serious recession, their first 
differencing (see footnote 6) used only the years 1986 and 1989. Hence the estimates 
were short-run. It is possible (see e.g. Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998; Slemrod, 
1996, 1998; Goolsbee, 2000) that these largely reflect intertemporal shifting and hence 
overstate the long-run values. Second, because the 1988 change in tax rates was not 
randomly assigned but was dependent upon income, the estimates are vulnerable to 
misspecification. In particular, some of the biggest marginal rate tax cuts were applied to 
high-income individuals.  If there were other nontax reasons that income growth was 
higher for those with higher initial income (i.e. there are other reasons for rising 
inequality), the estimated tax response for high-income individuals would be high even if 
tax-responsiveness were zero. 
Continuing in this latter vein, in the 1988 change in federal tax rates there were 
three ranges of significant marginal rate change: a significant increase of approximately 
15 percentage points in the marginal tax rate for some with very low taxable incomes, a 
decrease of roughly four to nine percentage points in marginal tax rates for some mid-
range taxable incomes ($13,197 to $36,952) and a decrease of approximately eight 
percentage points in marginal tax rates for those at high taxable incomes (more than 
$63,347). According to Table 1, the first two ranges are associated with comparatively Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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small tax response elasticities but the high range has a high tax response. Hence if as 
Table 1 suggests, the tax-response elasticities are much higher at higher income, the tax 
changes of 1988 should have yielded an increase in the share of income received by top 
earners.
7 Saez and Veall (2005) analyze the top share for the general population 
extensively over this period. They show that in the few years around 1988 there indeed 
was an increase in top shares for the general population but it was a spike: the effect was 
not persistent suggesting that the long-run responses could be much less than those 
estimated by Sillamaa and Veall for the short run. 
 Saez and Veall did not do these calculations separately for the senior population. 
The next section will fill that gap. Besides the implications for the responsiveness of 
seniors to labour market incentives, the top shares may be of interest regarding such 
issues as income inequality among seniors. 
 
3. Empirical Findings 
The data source is the Statistics Canada Longitudinal Administrative Database, 
the same data source used by Sillamaa and Veall (2001) and Saez and Veall (2005). Most 
of the calculations focus on senior (age 65 and over) taxfilers only.  Table 2 provides a 
snapshot of various thresholds in 2002. So for example in that year for Canadian seniors 
as a whole, the top one per cent thresholds for before tax income, market income (all 
income excluding government transfer payments), employment income not including 
self-employment income and employment income including self-employment income 
                                                 
7 A clawback of OAS income was introduced in 1989 for those with high incomes, but, as shall be 
discussed, those in the top one per cent normally were in the range of complete clawback, and hence the 
clawback induced no change in their marginal rates. Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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were $127,400, $115,800, $40,500 and $49,600 respectively. Thresholds vary by 
provinces, so that for example the top one per cent of total income earners in 
Newfoundland were those with total incomes $74,200 and above.  In Alberta, the top one 





Income Thresholds for Top One Per Cent, Seniors, 2002, by Province 
  Type of Income: 






Canada $127,400  $115,800  $40,500  $49,600 
Newfoundland $74,200  $61,900  $20,100  $27,000 
PEI $94,200  $82,000  $25,000  $31,700 
Nova Scotia  $103,500  $92,300  $29,000  $34,100 
New Brunswick  $91,300  $79,600  $25,000  $30,400 
Quebec $109,900  $98,400  $31,400  $38,400 
Ontario $145,100  $133,400  $46,300  $57,000 
Manitoba $104,000  $93,100 $35,000  $41,500 
Saskatchewan $105,500  $93,800  $28,000  $43,500 
Alberta $143,700  $132,400  $56,300  $64,500 
British Columbia  $126,400  $115,300  $42,100  $48,500 
 
Note that these are threshold incomes. As Table 3 notes, mean incomes for those in the 
top one per cent are much higher. For example for Canada as a whole in 2002, the top 
one per cent of senior total income earners (i.e. seniors with total incomes exceeding 
$127,400) had a mean market income of $304,600 and the top one per cent of senior 
employment earners had a mean employment income of $164,600. This compares to an Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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average for all senior taxfilers of about $15,000 market income and $2700 employment 
income respectively. 
Table 3 
Mean Incomes for Top One Per Cent and All Taxfilers, 
 Seniors, 2002, by Gender and Marital Status 
  Type of Income: 








All Top  1% 
(39,775) 
$316,100 $304,600 $141,100  $164,600 
 All 
(3,976,250) 





$341,200 $329,700 $156,400  $175,900 
 All 
(1,746,075) 





$318,800 $307,000 $155,800  $177,700 
 All 
(409,625) 





$345,600 $334,100 $156,400  $175,700 
 All 
(1,336,450) 





$254,500 $243,100 $91,500  $114,200 
 All 
(2,230,150) 





$241,500 $230,100 $99,100  $126,200 
 All 
(1,270,875) 





$271,700 260,600 $86,800  $107,100 
 All 
(959,300) 
$18,900 $9,800  $1,300  $1,500 
 Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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Within the top one per cent of senior income earners, about two-thirds are men 
and about one-third are women. Within this group, mean total income is about one-third 
higher for the men and male mean employment income is about 70 per cent higher. In 
addition, married men outnumber single men by five to one, although marital status 
differences in mean income for men are not large. There are more single women than 
married women in the group with married women having higher mean total and market 
income while single women have higher employment income. 
Given the general picture of the current composition of the top one per cent of 
senior income earners, let us now turn to the trend over the 1982 to 2002 period, which is 
the full LAD sample period. This is presented in a series of graphs. 
Figure 3.1 plots the top one per cent shares for market income, employment 
income including self-employment income and employment income not including self-
employment income. Examining the market income line around 1988, it is difficult to see 
any sign of a 1988 spike. There is more evidence of a 1988-89 spike for the two 
employment income measures (consistent with the Sillamaa and Veall results) but it is 
clear that these are evidence of short-run rather than long-run responses. Rather the 
dominant feature of the graphs is a long-term trend towards increased top shares. For 
market income, in 1982, the top one per cent of market income earners took in about 13% 
of all market income earned by seniors. By 2002, this had increased to 21%. 
This is a substantial increase and substantial polarization.  (The corresponding 
numbers for the population as a whole are reported in Saez and Veall as being 8% in 
1982 and 13% in 2002.)  But this trend pales in comparison to the change in employment 
income shown in Figure 3.1. For all employment income, the top one per cent share Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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increases from 32% in 1982 to over 60% in 2002. And the increases are even sharper 
when self–employment income is excluded. 
Figure 3.2 shows total senior income as a share of all income. It can be seen that 
there has been an upward drift in the share seniors earn of all market income, from a little 
more than 7 per cent in 1982 to a little more than 9 per cent in 2002. The corresponding 
change in employment income (whether or not self-employment income is included) has 
been small and remains below 2 per cent of all employment income in 2002. 
Finally Figure 3.3 reminds us that while there have been huge changes for the top 
1% of senior income earners, they are relatively small from the perspective of the entire 
population. The top one per cent of the senior population has increased its share of all 
market income from about 1.0% in 1982 to about 1.8% in 2002. There has been a 
corresponding increase in employment income but in 2002 it was still just over 1.0 % of 
all employment income. 
In Appendix 1 available upon request, Figures A1.1 to A1.10 give comparable 
graphs for employment income (including self-employment income) for all provinces, 
from Newfoundland to British Columbia. They can be summarized rather easily. All look 
more or less like the Canada-wide graphs. In particular, while sometimes there is a spike 
around 1988, there is no evidence of long-run persistence in responsiveness to that tax 
change. And celebrated cuts in top marginal tax rates in the last part of the sample period 
(in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and most recently Saskatchewan) appear to have 
had little effect on the top share: universally, top shares were increasing more rapidly 
during the 1980s before both provincial and federal cuts in top marginal tax rates than 
they increased during the 1990s when there were cuts in top marginal tax rates. Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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 Appendix 2 (also available upon request) provides comparable tables and graphs 
for the 55-64 age group. Probably the most striking contrast with the 65+ age group 
results is that the top 1% is much more male dominated. (As in the 65+ group, within 
men, married men are more than proportionately represented.)  Overall, there has been 
significant polarization in this age group as well, with the share of employment income 
received by the top 1% of earners rising from about 9% in 1982 to 17% in 2002. 
However, in this age range the bulk of employment income is still earned by those at 
lower incomes. There are also more striking differences across provinces.  More detailed 
study of this age group will be left for further research, as it is clear that the conclusions 
for the 65+ age group do not necessarily carry over. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  Of all the employment income earned by the older population in 1982, the top one 
per cent of such earners received about 32%. This fraction increased steadily during the 
1980s and the 1990s so that by 2002, it was over 60%. This trend is broadly similar 
across provinces and does not appear to have been accelerated by top marginal tax rate 
reductions in 1988. Hence there is little evidence from this time series that further 
marginal tax rate reductions would have an important permanent effect on aggregate 
labour supply for this age group. Moreover, it is unlikely that this period could provide 
evidence regarding aggregate labour supply effects for this group with respect to 
reductions in Old Age Security or Guaranteed Income Supplement clawbacks, because 
the top 1% of earners are above the income range served by these programs. Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada 
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Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.2
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Figure 3.3 
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Figure A1.3
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Figure A1.5
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Figure A1.7
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Figure A1.9
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Tables and Graphs for Taxfilers Aged 55-64, Canada 
 
Table A2.1 
Income Thresholds for Top One Per Cent, Taxfilers Ages 55-64, 2002, by Province 
  Type of Income: 






Canada $204,400  $203,500  $143,000  $172,100 
Newfoundland $129,700  $126,300  $  99,100  $104,800 
PEI $133,900  $133,900  $  99,500  $115,700 
Nova Scotia  $153,800  $153,100  $114,100  $131,000 
New Brunswick  $135,500  $135,200  $102,900  $113,700 
Quebec $164,500  $163,900  $111,800  $134,600 
Ontario $247,400  $246,800  $166,600  $209,500 
Manitoba $163,700  $162,400  $117,500  $137,300 
Saskatchewan $144,100  $144,100  $110,300  $122,100 
Alberta $277,600  $277,600  $215,500  $234,300 
British Columbia  $190,400  $189,700  $144,700  $162,500 
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Mean Incomes for Top One Per Cent and All Taxfilers, 
 Ages 55-64, 2002, by Gender and Marital Status 
  Type of Income: 








All Top  1% 
(29,200) 
$485,100 $484,300 $354,000  $401,700 
 All 
(2,921,600) 





$494,500 $493,200 $359,700  $407,500 
 All 
(1,483,000) 





$499,000 $497,400 $376,000  $412,800 
 All 
(283,700) 





$494,100 $492,800 $358,100  $407,000 
 All 
(1,199,300) 





$415,000 $417,100 $303,600  $346,400 
 All 
(1,438,575) 





$400,800 $405,600 $294,500  $321,900 
 All 
(437,400) 





$420,600 421,500 $306,400  $355,000 
 All 
(1,001,175) 
$22,900 $20,700  $13,500  $14,700 
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Figure A2.1
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Figure A2.3
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Figure A2.5
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Figure A2.7
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Figure A2.9
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Figure A2.11
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